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This paper presents a dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium model with a single friction in all markets:
sticky information. In this economy, agents are inattentive because of costs of acquiring, absorbing
and processing information, so that the actions of consumers, workers and firms are slow to incorporate
news. This paper presents the details of how an economy with pervasive inattentiveness functions,
and develops a set of algorithms that solve the model quickly. It then applies these to estimate the
model using data for the United States post-1986  and for the Euro-area post-1993, and to conduct counterfactual
policy experiments. The end result is a laboratory that is rich enough to account for the dynamics of
at least five macroeconomic series (inflation, output, hours, interest rates, and wages), and which can
be used to inform applied monetary policy.
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rreis@columbia.eduFollowing on Keyness desire that economists be as useful as dentists, Lucas (1980) ar-
gues that this would amount to the following: Our task, as I see it, is to write a FORTRAN
program that will accept specic economic policy rules as input and will generate as out-
put statistics describing the operating characteristics of time series we care about, which
are predicted to result from these policies. Starting with Kydland and Prescott (1982),
and with Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) in the context of monetary policy, the computer
program that Lucas asked for has taken the form of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) models.1 This paper follows the seminal work of Taylor (1979) in using one of
these models to ask a series of hypothetical monetary policy questions.
However, the initial versions of monetary DSGE models su¤er from one problem: they
imply a rapid adjustment of many macroeconomic variables to shocks, while in the data,
these responses tend to be gradual and delayed. The predictions of the standard classical
model regarding investment, consumption, real wages, or ination lack stickiness, to use the
term coined by Sims (1998) and Mankiw and Reis (2006). The most popular approach for
addressing this disconnect between theory and data follows the inuential work of Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) by adding many rigidities that stand in the way of
adjustment: sticky but indexed prices in goods markets, adjustment costs in investment
markets, habits in consumption markets, and sticky but indexed wages in labor markets.
This paper contributes to the literature by providing an alternative DSGE model of
business cycles and monetary policy. The only source of rigidity is inattention in all markets
by agents who choose to only update their information sporadically in order to save on
the xed costs of acquiring, absorbing, and processing information (Reis, 2006a, 2006b).
Information is sticky because di¤erent agents update their information at di¤erent dates,
so they only gradually learn of news. I call it the sticky information in general equilibrium,
or SIGE, model. Mankiw and Reis (2006, 2007) provided a rst glimpse of SIGE, and this
paper presents the model and its solution in full. I then proceed to estimate it for the United
States after 1986 and the euro area after 1993 and to conduct a few policy experiments.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the model and discusses its current
limitations. Section 2 log-linearizes the model to arrive at a set of reduced-form relations
1These are quickly growing in richness and being used in central banks. For a few examples, they are
now in use at the ECB (Smets and Wouters, 2003), the Board of Governors (Erceg, Guerrieri and Gust,
2006), and the IMF (Bayoumi, 2004).
2that characterize the equilibrium. Section 3 describes an algorithm to compute a solution
and derives formulas to calculate the key inputs into estimation (the likelihood function)
and policy analysis (a social welfare function). Section 4 reviews the literature on estimating
models with sticky information and describes the approach taken in this paper. Section 5
presents the estimation results for the United States and the euro area, while section 6
examines the sensitivity of the estimates. Section 7 answers a few policy questions, and
section 8 concludes.
1 The SIGE model
The SIGE model belongs to the wide class of general-equilibrium models with monopolistic
competition that have become the workhorse for the study of monetary policy (surveyed
in Woodford, 2003b). There are three sets of markets where agents meet every period:
markets for di¤erent varieties of goods, where monopolistic rms sell varieties of goods to
households; a market for savings, where households trade bonds and interest rates change
to balance borrowing and lending; and markets for labor, where monopolistic households
sell varieties of labor to rms. I present each of these markets in turn, before describing the
assumptions on information and attention.
1.1 The goods market
On the buying side, there is a continuum of shoppers indexed by j that consume a continuum
of varieties of goods in the unit interval indexed by i, denoted by Ct;j(i). A bundle of these
varieties of goods yields utility according to a Dixit-Stiglitz function with a time-varying
and random elasticity of substitution ~ t. Each good trades at price Pt;i and the problem of















Pt;iCt;j(i) < Zt;j: (2)
The solution to this problem is Ct;j(i) = Ct;j (Pt;i=Pt)
 ~ t, where the price index is





and implies that, conditional on the optimal choices
of the shopper, Zt;j = PtCt;j. Integrating over the continuum of shoppers gives the total
3demand for variety i: Z 1
0





On the selling side of the market, there is a monopolistic rm for each variety of the
good. Each of these rms, indexed by i, operates a technology that uses labor Nt;i at cost
Wt to produce good i under diminishing returns to scale with  2 (0;1) and a common
technology shock At. The rms sales department is in charge of setting the price Pt;i and
selling the output Yt;i to maximize real after-tax prots subject to the technology and the























t (:) expectations operator of the sales department of rm i depends on its infor-
mation, which I will discuss later. The government intervenes in two ways in the actions
of the rm: collecting a xed sales tax, p, and buying a time-varying and random share,
1 1=Gt; of the goods in the market. These governmental purchases are wasted, and I refer
to them broadly as aggregate demand shocks. Aggregate output is Yt =
R 1
0 Yt;id i.2




t [(1   p)~ tWtNt;i=Pt]
E
(i)
t [(~ t   1)Yt;i=Pt]
: (7)
If the rm observed all the variables on the right-hand side, this condition would state that
the nominal price charged, Pt;i, is equal to a markup, (1   p)~ t=(~ t   1), stemming from
taxes and the ability to exploit an elastic demand curve, over nominal marginal costs, which
equal the cost of an extra unit of labor, Wt; divided by its marginal product, Yt;i=Nt;i.





^ t=( ^ t 1)
leads to the same results, up to a
rst-order log-linear approximation.
41.2 The bond market
In this market, saver-planners meet each other to trade one-period bonds. Their aim is to














where  is the discount factor and  is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. They
have an intertemporal budget constraint:
Mt+1;j = t+1 [Mt;j   Ct;j + (1   w)Wt;jLt;j=Pt + Tt;j]: (9)
The saver-planner j enters the period with real wealth Mt;j, uses some of it to consume,
earns labor income at the wage rate Wt;j after paying a xed labor income tax w, and
receives a lump-sum transfer Tt;j. The transfer Tt;j includes lump-sum taxes, prots and
losses from rms, and payments from an insurance contract that all households signed at
date 0 that ensures that every period they are all left with the same wealth. Savings
accumulate at the real interest rate t+1; although, in equilibrium, bonds are in zero net
supply, so savings integrate to zero over all consumers.
The dynamic program that characterizes the saver-planners problem is messy so it
is covered in the appendix. If j = 0 denotes the saver-planner that forms expectations
rationally based on up-to-date information, so E
(0)



















The rst equation is the standard Euler equation for a well-informed agent. It states that
the marginal utility of consuming today is equal to the expected discounted marginal utility
of consuming tomorrow times the return on savings. The second equation notes that agents
who are not so well informed set their marginal utility of consumption to what they expect
it would be with full information.
The monetary policy-maker intervenes in this market by supplying reserves at an inter-
est rate. Because these reserves are substitutable with the bonds that consumers trade
5among themselves, the central bank can target a value for the nominal interest rate,
it  l o g[Et (t+1Pt+1=Pt)]; standing ready to issue as many reserves as necessary to ensure
it. Alternatively, one could introduce money directly as an additive term in the utility
function of the agents and then have the cental bank control the money supply to target an
interest rate (see Woodford, 1998, for an elaboration of this point). The nominal interest
rate follows some policy rule subject to exogenous monetary shocks "t. To x ideas, and
because it will be the policy rule used in the estimation, consider a Taylor rule:













t is the level of output in the classical or attentive equilibrium (sometimes called
the natural output level).
1.3 The labor market
This market features workers on the selling side and rms on the buying side. The rms,
indexed by i, have a purchasing department hiring a continuum of varieties of labor in-
dexed by k in the amount Nt;i(k) at price Wt;k and combining them into the labor input
Nt;i according to a Dixit-Stiglitz function with a random and time-varying elasticity of sub-
stitution ~ t. The purchasing departments problem is to solve, given current wages and a















The solution to this problem is Nt;i(k) = Nt;i (Wt;k=Wt); where WtNt;i =
R 1
0 Wt;kNt;i(k)d k





. Aggregating over all rms gives the
total demand for labor variety k:
Z 1
0





Each worker is a monopolistic supplier of a variety of labor. The workers aim is to












1 + 1= 
1
A; (15)
where  is the discount factor and   is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. They face
the same intertemporal budget constraint as the consumers in equation (9), and they also
take into account the demand for their good from Lt;k =
R 1
0 Nt;i(k)d i and equation (14).
Aggregate labor employed is Lt =
R
Lt;kd k.3 The optimality conditions are:
~ t



































The rst condition is the standard intertemporal labor supply Euler equation for a well-
informed worker. If ~ t is xed, it states that the marginal disutility of supplying labor
today (L
1= 
t;0 ) divided by the real wage (Wt;0=Pt) equals the discounted marginal disutility
tomorrow (L
1= 
t+1;0) divided by the real wage tomorrow (Wt+1;0=Pt+1) times the real interest
rate. With time-varying ~ t, the Euler equation takes into account the change in the markup
that the monopolistic worker wants to charge. The second condition is the counterpart to
condition (11) in the consumer problem for the fully-informed case E(k) = Et, it simply
states that Wt;k = Wt;0.
1.4 Inf ormati on,agents and attenti on
Uncertainty in this economy arises because every period there is a di¤erent realization of
the random variables characterizing productivity (At), aggregate demand (Gt), price and
wage markups (~ t and ~ t), and monetary policy ("t).
If all agents are fully-informed, then the model described above is a standard classi-
cal model. While the discussion presented consumers (shoppers and saver-planners) and
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t=( ^ t 1)
instead leads to the same
results up to a log-linear approximation.










1 + 1= 
; (18)
and with j = k since there is common information. The decisions on the consumption
of each variety, total consumption, and the wage to charge, are all done with rational
expectations using all available information. Likewise, if the two departments of the rm
share their information, they can be thought of as a single decisionmaker.
The SIGE model introduces only one new assumption relative to this classical bench-
mark: while the expectations of each agent are formed rationally, they do not necessarily
use all availables information. More concretely, it assumes that there are xed costs of
acquiring, absorbing and procesing information, so that agents optimally choose to only
update their information sporadically (Reis, 2006a, 2006b). This inattentiveness is present
in all markets, by the planner-savers in the savings markets, by the sales departments of
rms in the goods markets, and by the workers in the labor market. Separating consumers
from workers allows them to potentially update their information at di¤erent frequencies.
In this case, while they share a household, in the sense of a common objective (18) and a
common budget constraint (9), they do not necessarily need to share information. When
workers update their information, they also learn about what the consumer has been doing,
and vice-versa for consumers when they updates.
While inattentiveness occurs in all markets, not all agents in this economy are inatten-
tive. In the goods market, the model assumes that the consumer is separated into two units:
the saver-planner who updates information infrequently and the shopper who knows about
the expenditure plan of the saver and observes the relative prices of the di¤erent goods.
This assumption is not implausible: while the choice of how much to spend in total and how
much to save requires solving an intertemporal optimization problem and making forecasts
into the innite future, to choose the relative proportion of each good to buy requires only
seeing goods prices. The main reason to make this assumption, though, is a current lim-
itation in our knowledge. If the monopolistic rms in the goods market faced inattentive
shoppers, they would want to exploit them to raise prots, but the shoppers would then
take this into account in choosing how often to be inattentive. The equilibrium of this game
has not yet been fully studied, and assuming that shoppers are attentive avoids it entirely.
8The same argument leads to separating the rm into an inattentive sales-production team
and an attentive purchasing department.
Within the inattentiveness model, the SIGE model adds an extra restriction: that the
stochastic process for the expected costs of planning is such that the distribution of inatten-
tiveness for consumers, workers and rm is exponential. Reis (2006b) established the strict
conditions under which this will hold for the rms problem. Under these conditions, for
a linearized homoskedastic economy, the optimal rate of arrival of information is xed so
that it can be treated as a parameter (bearing in mind that it maps into the monetary cost
of updating information). Therefore, every period, a fraction  of planner-savers updates
its information, so there are  agents who have current information, (1   ) that have
one-period-old information, (1   )2 with two-period-old information, and so on. Because
agents only di¤er on the date at which they last updated, we can group them and let j
denote how long ago the planner last updated. Likewise, a share  of rms and ! or workers
update their information every periods, so they can be grouped into groups i of size (1 )i
and groups k of size !(1   !)k, according to how long it has been since they last updated.
The inattentive equilibrium is dened as follows: the set of aggregate variables fYt;Ltg,
the output of each variety fYt;ig, the labor of each variety fLt;jg, the prices of each good
fYt;ig, wages fWt;ig, and interest rates fitg, such that consumers, workers and rms behave
optimally (as described above), all markets clear, and monetary policy follows a rule like
equation (12), with P 1 = 0; for all dates t from 0 to innity as a function of the ex-
ogenous paths for technology fAtg, monetary policy shocks f"tg, aggregate demand fGtg,
goods substitutability f~ tg, and labor substitutability f~ tg. The classical equilibrium is
the equilibrium when  =  = ! = 1, so that all are attentive.
1.5 M i ssi ng work on the mi c ro- f oundati ons ofthe model
In the tradition of Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), the
SIGE model presented above makes a few simplifying assumptions, some of which are more
common and others perhaps more unusual. Each of these presents an opportunity for future
work to improve the model. I now discuss a few that seem particularly promising.
First, the model lacks investment and capital accumulation. Whether this absence
signicantly a¤ects the dynamics of the other variables in this class of models is open
to debate (Woodford, 2005, Sveen and Weinke, 2005), but modelling investment has the
9benet of extending the model to explain one more macroeconomic variable. The SIGE
model omits investment because the behavior of inattentive investors accumulating capital
has not yet been studied, whereas there is previous work on the micro-foundations and
implications of inattentiveness on the part of consumers (Reis, 2006a), price-setting rms
(Mankiw and Reis, 2002, Reis, 2006b), and workers (Mankiw and Reis 2003). Gabaix and
Laibson (2002) and Abel, Eberly and Panageas (2007) study nancial investment decisions
with inattentiveness, but the step from this work to study physical investment and capital
accumulation remains to be taken.
Second, the model lacks international trade and exchange rates. The reason for this
omission is the same as for investment: the models of inattentive behavior in international
markets are still missing. Progress in this area will likely come soon, as Bachetta and van
Wincoop (2006) have already lled some of the gap. Once this is completed, one can build
an open economy SIGE to use for economies other than the United States or the euro area.
Third, the model lacks wealth heterogeneity since it assumes a complete insurance con-
tract with which households fully diversify their risks. Most business cycle models make this
assumption because it makes them more tractable by collapsing the wealth distribution to
a single point. Relaxing this assumption and numerically computing the equilibria should
not be di¢cult, but it has not yet been undertaken.
With regard to the micro-foundations of inattentiveness, the model assumes that when
agents pay the cost to obtain new information, they can observe everything. While there is
an explicit xed cost of information, the variable cost is zero. This assumption is useful be-
cause it allows the model to emphasize the decision of wh en and h o w o f ten to pay attention,
which can then be studied in detail. It can be easily relaxed to allow people to observe only
some things but not everything when they update (see e.g., Carroll and Slacalek, 2007).
A harder extension would be to also consider the decision of h o w much to pay attention,
by letting people pick which pieces of news to look at when they update. Mackowiack and
Wiederholt (2007) have made promising progress in this area, following Sims (1998), but
the models are still not at the point where they can be put in general equilibrium and taken
to the data.
One implication of removing the assumption that updating agents learn everything, is
that there is no longer common knowledge in the economy. This leads to a new source of
strategic interactions between agents who have di¤erent information and know that no one
10knows everything. Woodford (2003c), followed by Hellwig (2002), Amato and Shin (2006),
Morris and Shin (2006) and Adam (2007) have studied some of the implications of this
behavior, and recent work by Lorenzoni (2008) moves towards turning these insights into a
business cycle model that could be taken to the data. Hellwig and Veldkamp (2008) study
another source of strategic interaction, on whether agents coordinate their attention times.
These extra ingredients promise to enrich future models of inattentiveness.
The SIGE model ignores another source of strategic interaction. The model assumes
that consumers had inattentive planners and attentive shoppers, while rms have inattentive
sales departments and attentive purchasing departments. Consequently, monopolists face
attentive agents in every market. This is important because if a monopolist sold its product
to some buyers that are inattentive, then it would want to exploit their inattentiveness to
raise its prots (Gabaix and Laibson, 2006). These inattentive buyers would take into
account this extra cost of being inattentive and alter their choices of when to update their
information and how to act when uninformed. The equilibrium of this game has not, to my
knowledge, been fully studied.
Overall, the SIGE model ignores many features that could lead to new and interesting
insights. They were omitted typically because they are not su¢ciently understood to put
them into the full DSGE setup in this paper.
2 The reduc ed- f orm log- li near equi li bri um
The appendix describes how to log-linearize the equilibrium conditions around the Pareto-
optimal steady state, where all the random variables are equal to their mean and the tax
rates ensure that markups are zero. This gives a set of reduced-form relations characterizing
the equilibrium of the log-linearized values of key aggregate variables (denoted with small
letters and a t subscript), as a function of parameters and steady-state values (in small
letters but no subscript).
First, summing the production function for the individual rms gives an aggregate
relation between output (yt), productivity (at) and labor (lt) with decreasing returns to
scale at rate :
yt = at + lt: (19)
Second, the equilibrium in the goods market leads to a Phillips curve (or aggregate
11supply) linking the price level (pt) to marginal costs and desired markups. Real marginal
costs rise with real wages (wt  pt), since these are the cost of inputs; they rise with output
(yt), as a result of decreasing returns to scale; and they fall with productivity (at). Desired
markups are lower the higher is the elasticity of substitution across goods varieties (t),







(wt   pt) + (1   )yt   at
 + (1   )
 
t
(   1)[ + (1   )]

(20)
Since only a fraction  of rms update their information and set their plans, current shocks
only have an immediate impact of  on prices.
Third, the equilibrium in the bond market leads to an IS curve (or aggregate demand)
relating output to three variables: a measure of wealth, namely, yc
1 = l i mi! 1 Et (yt+i),
since higher expected future output stimulates current spending; the long real interest rate,
dened as Rt = Et
P1
j=0 (it+j   pt+1+j), since higher expected interest rates encourage





(1   )jEt j (yc
1   Rt) + gt; (21)
Every period, only a randomly drawn share  of consumers update their plan, so the larger
is , the more consumption responds to shocks as they occur.
Fourth, equilibrium in the labor market leads to a wage curve (or labor supply) according
to which current wages (wt) are higher: with higher prices, since workers care about real
wages; with higher expected real wages, since these push up the demand for a workers
variety of labor; with higher employment, since the marginal disutility of working rises;
with higher wealth, since leisure is a normal good; with lower interest rates, since the
return on savings is lower and the incentive to work to save is thus also lower; and with a
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(22)
The fraction of up-to-date workers is !, with the remaining workers setting their wage to
what they expected would be optimal when they last updated.
Finally, the policy rule gives the last reduced-form equilibrium relation. In the case of
12the Taylor rule, this relation is:
it = ppt + y(yt   yc
t)   "t: (23)
These 5 equations give the equilibrium values for ination, nominal interest rates, output
growth, employment, and real wage growth, xt = fpt;it;yt;lt;(wt pt)g; as a function
of the ve exogenous shocks to aggregate productivity growth, aggregate demand, goods
markups, labor markups, and monetary policy, st = fat;gt;t;t;"tg. I assume that
each of these shocks follows an independent stationary stochastic process with (potentially
innite) moving-average representation. This assumption allows for a very general repre-
sentation of the shocks hitting the economy. One implication is that there is a stochastic
trend in the economy driven by productivity, which seems consistent with the data.
3 Solvi ng f or the equi li bri um
I rst solve for the equilibrium when all are attentive and then solve for the inattentive
equilibrium under di¤erent policy rules. Finally, I derive expressions for the likelihood and
social welfare functions.
3.1 The c lassi c al equi li bri um
In the classical equilibrium, all the agents are attentive, and simple algebra shows that
output:
yc
t = at + [gt + t=(   1) + t=(   1)]; (24)
where  =  =(1 +  ), under the assumption that  = 1. Assuming that the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution equals one implies that output moves one-to-one with the non-
stationary productivity shocks, while hours lc
t = (yc
t   at)= are stationary, as seems to be
the case in the data.
In the classical equilibrium, output rises with each of the four real shocks, but it is
independent of monetary policy shocks and the monetary policy rule. There are no nominal
rigidities in this classical economy, so the classical dichotomy holdsm, with real variables
being independent of monetary shocks.
Finally, it is important to note that this classical equilibrium is not necessarily optimal.
13The denition of a Pareto optimum is not obvious when there are changes in preferences.
However, if the shocks to the preferences lead to an ine¢ciency relative to their steady-state
values, then the optimal output is yo
t = at+gt, so shocks to the markups lead to ine¢cient
uctuations even if all agents are attentive.
3.2 The i nattenti veness equi li bri um
The solution of the inattentiveness equilibrium is a little more involved. One useful piece
of notation is to write each variable in terms of its moving-average representation. For
instance, for the generic shock s 2 S = fa; g; ; ; "g; Wolds theorem implies that there
is a representation st =
P1
n=0 ^ snes
t n, where the es
t are independent zero-mean random






where the new coe¢cients (s) follow easily from equation (24) and the denitions of 
and ^ sn. Another useful piece of notation is to denote the share of people that have updated
after n periods by n = 
Pn
i=0(1   )i; n = 
Pn




The rst result gives the rst key step in the algorithm to solve the model:
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with ^ yn(s),th en,reg ardless o fth e p o licyrule:
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g (26)
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n)n=	d e n
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0 for s = ":
(28)
14The proof of this (and all other results) is in the appendix. It implies that given a
solution for prices, one can easily compute the solution for output. A closely associated
result is:
Proposi ti on 2. Th e mo ving - averag e co e¢cients f o r th e sh o rt- term real interest,wag es,
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( ^ wn   ^ pn)(s) = [1 + (1=   1)](1=n   1) ^ pn(s) (30)
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 for s = a
0 for s = g;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(31)
With these two propositions and a solution for prices, we have the equilibrium values of
all the real variables independently of the monetary policy rule. We can therefore focus on
solving for prices alone.
If the policy rule is the one proposed by Taylor, then using the Fisher equation it =
rt + Et (pt+1), and the results in the previous two propositions, leads to the solution for
the price level:4
Proposi ti on 3. I fth e p o licyrule is a Tay lo r rule,it = ppt + y(yt   yn
t )   "t; th e
und eterminedco e¢cients f o r th e p rice level satisf yth e seco nd - o rd er d i¤erence equatio n:
An+1^ pn+1(s)   Bn^ pn(s) + Cn 1^ pn 1(s) = Dn(s)^ sn f o r n = 0;1;2;::: (32)
wh ere An = 1 + 	n=n; Bn = An + p + y	n; Cn = p; and (33)
Dn(s) =
8
> > > <




n+1^ sn + y [n(s)   (s)] for s = a;;
[ n(s) 1]
n  
[ n+1(s) 1] ^ sn+1
n+1^ sn + y [n(s)   (s)] for s = g
 1 for s = "
(34)
4Mankiw and Reis (2007) presented an initial version of this result, but limited to AR(1) shocks.
15Solving the di¤erence equation requires two boundary conditions. As the time from
the shock goes to innity, all agents become aware of it, so the e¤ect of the shock on the
inattentive equilibrium is the same as that in the attentive equilibrium. Since the price
level converges to a constant (non-zero for the technology shocks and zero for the other
shocks), one boundary condition is l i mn! 1 (^ pn   ^ pn 1) = 0. The other boundary condition
is ^ p 1 = 0.
I solve the di¤erence equations by writing, separately for each shock, a system of N +1









 B0 A1 ::: 0 0 0
C0  B1 ::: 0 0 0
::: ::: ::: ::: ::: :::
0 0 :::  BN 2 AN 1 0
0 0 ::: CN 2  BN 1 AN























































Because the system has a special tri-diagonal structure, it is numerically easy to solve. I
have set N at either 100, 500, or 1000 and in almost all cases, both the ignored terms of
order above N, and the change in the rst 100 coe¢cients as N changed were negligible.
Because the goal of this paper is to provide a model that can be used to study monetary
policy, it is important to consider alternative policy rules to the Taylor rule. The main
alternative to interest-rate rules are targeting rules (Svensson, 2003). Ball, Mankiw, and
Reis (2005) show that if only rms are inattentive, an elastic price standard is optimal:
Proposi ti on 4. I fp o licyf o llo ws an elastic p rice- level stand ard ,pt = Kt   (yt   yo
t); th e








f o r n = 0;1;2;::: (36)
wh ere ~ (s) = (s) f o r s = a; g; and ~ (s) = 0 f o r s = ; .
The literature contains many alternative policy rules , and the appendix presents a few
more and their corresponding solution. Together with the results in this section, this should
provide su¢cient eveidence that despite the innite number of expectations going backward
16and the lack of a recursive representation for the endogenous variables, the SIGE model is
still easy to solve.5
3.3 The li keli hood and welf are f unc ti ons
The key input into likelihood-based estimation is the likelihood function. Letting xt denote
the 5x1 column vector with the endogenous variables of the model and et denote the column
vector with the 5 exogenous shocks, the solution in propositions 1 to 4 can be expressed as
a set of 5x5 matrices n such that xt =
PN
n=1 net n. The data consists of time-series on
xt from t = 1 to t = T for the endogenous variables, that can be stacked in a 5Tx1 vector
X, and the unknown parameters can be collected in the vector . The likelihood function
is then denoted by L(Xj).
I assume that the ve zero-mean shocks es
t are normally distributed with variances 2
s.
The vector et therefore follows a multivariate normal distribution with diagonal covariance
matrix . The notation IN denotes an identity matrix of size N and 
 is the Kronecker
product of two matrices. Since the model is linear, X follows a multivariate normal distri-
bution. This leads to the nextpropositions, taken from Mankiw and Reis (2007):
Proposi ti on 5. Letting
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th e lik elih o o df unctio n is:











Mankiw and Reis (2007) note that the large 5T5T matrix 
(IN 
 )
0 can be inverted
either with a Choleski decomposition or by choosing N = T to re-express the problem in
5Building on some of the results above, Meyer-Godhe (2007) recently combined this approach with others
in the literature to provide a unied user-friendly algorithm that can solve most DSGE models with forward
and lagged expectations without requiring almost any algebra on the part of the user (unlike the propositions
above). His set of programs holds the promise of further advancing this literature.
17terms of a system of linear equations. Either way, one can evaluate the log-likelihood
function quickly and reliably.
A natural way to compare the performance of di¤erent policy rules is to compute the
utility of the agents in the model. I focus on the unconditional expectation of a utilitarian











Because the model assumes that all households are ex ante identical and there are complete
insurance markets, it is natural to assume that all households get the same weight in the
integral. Morevoer, because one wants a rule that performs well across circumstances, it
makes sense to take the ex ante perspective provided by the unconditional expectation that
integrates over all possible initial conditions. The appendix proves the following result:
Proposi ti on 6. An ap p ro x imate f o rmula f o r th e welf are benets in p ercentag e units o f
stead y - state co nsump tio n o fa p o licy(1) startingf ro m a p o licy(0) are
e xp
n
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0 for s = ";a;
^ sn=(   1) for s = 
 ^ sn=n for s = g
(42)
Combining this result with those in propositions 1 to 4, it is easy to evaluate this expression
and compare the performance of di¤erent policy rules.
4 Esti mati ng sti c ky i nf ormati on
Taking sticky information models to the data has been an active eld of research. One
approach is to look for direct evidence of inattentiveness using micro data. Carroll (2003)
18uses surveys of ination expectations to show that the publics forecasts lag the forecasts
made by professionals.6 Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2004) show that the disagreement in
the ination expectations in the survey data have properties consistent with sticky infor-
mation.7 Reis (2006a) and Carroll and Slacalek (2006) interpret some of the literature on
the sensitivity and smoothness of microeconomic consumption data in the light of sticky
information, and Klenow and Willis (2007) and Knotek (2006) nd slow dissemination of
information in the micro data on prices. For the most part, this literature has supported the
sticky information assumption, and the associated estimates of the information-updating
rates are consistent.
A second approach estimates Phillips curves assuming sticky information on the part of
price setters only.8 These limited-information approaches typically use data on ination,
output, marginal costs and expectations to estimate simpler versions of equation (20), and
the results are typically good or mixed. One interesting nding that comes out of many
of these studies is that the main source of discrepancy between the model and the data is
not the inattentiveness or the slow dissemination of information, but the assumption that,
conditional on their information sets, agents form expectations rationally.
This paper takes a third approach, of estimating the model using full-information tech-
niques that exploit the restrictions imposed by general equilibrium. The few papers that
attempt this exercise typically nd either mixed or poor ts between the model and the
data.9 Mankiw and Reis (2006) explain the contrast between the negative results in some
of these papers and the mostly positive results found by the other two approaches. They
note that the papers in this literature assume inattentiveness only in price-setting, while
assuming that the other agents in the model were fully attentive. To t the data, however,
stickiness should be pervasive, and for the internal coherence of the model, inattentiveness
should apply to all decisions. By assuming attentive consumer and workers, the general-
equilibrium restrictions imposed in these papers are misspecied.
Allowing for pervasive stickiness, I take a Bayesian approach to deal with the uncertainty,
starting with a prior joint probability density p() and using the likelihood function L(X j )
6See also Dopke et al (2006a) and Nunes (2006).
7Also focussing on disagreement, see Gorodnichenko (2006), Branch (2007), and Rich and Tracy (2008).
8See Khan and Zhu (2006), Dopke et al (2006b), Korenok (2005), Pickering (2004), Coibion (2007), and
Molinari (2007).
9See Trabandt (2004), Andres et al (2005), Kiley (2007), Laforte (2007), Korenok and Swanson (2005,
2007), and Paustian and Pytlarczyz (2006).
19to obtain the posterior density of the parameters p( j X). This is done numerically, using
Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulations.10
The prior density p() follows the convention in the DSGE literature (for example, An
and Schorfheide, 2007), including assuming that the shocks st follow rs otder autoregres-
sive, or AR(1), processes with coe¢cients s and innovation standard deviations s. There
are twenty parameters in the model  = f;  ; ; ; ; a; a; "; "; g; g; ; ; ;
; p; y; ; !; g. Table 1 shows the moments of the prior densities.
Four of the parameters have a tight prior with zero variance: , which is set to one to
ensure stationary hours; ; which equals two-thirds to match the labor share in the data;
and a and a, since a series for productivity growth follows from the data on output and
employment in equation (19), so we can recover these parameters by a simple least-squares
regression.11
Each of the remaining sixteen parameters is treated independently and is assigned a
particular distribution (gamma, beta, or uniform) with a relatively large variance. The
mean elasticity of labor supply,  , is 2 and the elasticities of substitution across goods and
labor varieties,  and ; are set at 11, in line with the typical assumptions in the literature.
The mean s for the four shocks other than productivity are set to 0:9, so that the half-life
of the shocks is approximately six quarters and the s are set to 0:5, which lies in between
the two values estimated for a.12 The monetary policy parameters are set to p = 1:24
and y = :3 3 , which are the values estimated by Rudebusch (2002) on U.S. data. Finally,
the inattentiveness parameters ; !;  have a at prior in the unit interval.
As for the data, I use quarterly observations for two large economies: the United States
from 1986:3 to 2006:1 and the euro area from 1993:4 to 2005:4. I chose these economies
because they are closer to the closed-economy approximation in the model. The starting
dates coincide with the start of Alan Greenspans term as chairman of the FOMC and
with the signing of the Maastricht treaty that created the European Union and started the
coordination of monetary policy towards the euro, so they are consistent with assuming a
stable monetary policy rule. They come after the great moderation in economic activity,
10The exact algorithm is described in the appendix.
11The values for a and a are 0.03 and 0.51 respectively for the United States and 0.66 and 0.28 for the
Euro-area.
12For the markups, the value for the standard deviation is multiplied by 10, the elasticities of substitution
minus one, to counteract the multiplier that is visible in equations (20) and (22).
20consistent with assuming constant variances of the shocks.
The data for the United States is seasonally-adjusted, refers to the non-farm business
sector, and comprise observations on growth in real output per capita, growth in total
real compensation per hour, hours per capita, and ination. All series are de-meaned;
they use the implicit non-farm business price deator for the price level and for deating
nominal values; and growth rates refer to the change in the natural logarithm. The nominal
interest rate is the e¤ective federal funds rate. The data for the euro area are the area-
wide quarterly dataset that combines data from each countrys national accounts to build
consistent pseudo-aggregates for the whole region. Ination is the change in the log of
the GDP deator, output growth the change in log real GDP, and wages are measured
using total compensation. To obtain variables per capita, I use an interpolated Euro-area
population series. The hours data are de-trended using a linear trend.
5 Esti mates ofthe model
I discuss the estimates for the two regions separately.
5.1 The Uni ted States
Table 2 displays summary statistics of the posterior distribution of the parameters. The
posterior moments for the elasticities of substitution across varieties are close to the prior
assumptions from the literature. The elasticity of labor supply is quite large, but still in line
with typical assumptions in the business cycle literature. As for the shocks, the aggregate
demand disturbances are very persistent and quite volatile, so one can already guess that
they are playing an important part in the volatility of the economy.
The more interesting estimates are those of the inattentiveness parameters, on which
the prior had less information. Firms are estimated to be inattentive for six months, on
average, which is slightly more attentive than what was found in the studies described in
the previous section. Consumers are very inattentive, updating their information once every
three years, on average. This is not too shocking considering that xed costs of planning of
less than $ 100 per household can easily generate this length of inattentiveness. Moreover,
between 20 percent and 50 percent of the U.S. population lives hand-to-mouth, which is
equivalent to being inattentive forever (Reis, 2006a).
21The more surprising estimate in the table is the inattention of workers, who update their
information very often, on average once every four months. One possible explanation for this
result is that the data series used for wages measured total compensation, a large fraction
of which is accounted for by nonwage payments. It is conceivable that the many dimensions
of an employees compensation may actually be updated to include new information quite
often, even if the wage component of this compensation is not. Preliminary calculations
using a wage series nd more inattentive workers, and workers are also more inattentive in
the euro area, where nonwage compensation is less important.
Figure 1 shows the impulse responses of four variables (namely, ination, nominal inter-
est rates, hours worked, and the output gap) to one-standard-deviation impulses to the ve
shocks. The most surprising nding is perhaps the quick response of ination to monetary
policy shocks. The conventional wisdom from studies using postwar U.S. data is that this
response should be delayed and hump shaped. As recent studies have shown, however, ina-
tion responds much faster to monetary policy after 1980, which some researchers attribute
to changes in monetary policy (see Boivin and Giannoni, 2006, and the references therein).
From the perspective of the SIGE model, ination responds quickly to monetary policy be-
cause monetary policy shocks are quite short-lived. When policy changes, the SIGE model
predicts a change in the dynamics of the model that matches the data, surviving the Lucas
critique in a way that pricing models that always produce a hump shape do not.
Table 3 presents the predicted variance decompositions at di¤erent horizons. Monetary
policy shocks play a small role in the variance of most macroeconomic variables in the United
States after 1986, with the exception of the nominal interest rate and wages. Productivity
shocks are important for real wages at all horizons and for hours worked at short horizons,
while aggregate demand shocks explain much of the variability of output growth and hours
worked.13 Finally, ination is signicantly driven by the markup shocks.
5.2 Euro- area esti mates
Table 4 shows moments from the posterior distribution for the euro area. Relative to the
U.S. estimates, there are two di¤erences. First, the estimated average markups are larger for
the euro area than for the United States. Second, the elasticity of labor supply is somewhat
13These aggregate demand shocks are the models closest to the shocks to the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure that Hall (1997) argued account for most of the U.S. business cycle.
22smaller, although it is still large compared with typical estimates based on microeconomic
data. The inattentiveness of European rms is similar to that of American rms, while
consumers are more attentive and workers less attentive. This brings the two members of
the household in line, with both updating every nine to fteen months, on average.
Figure 2 shows the impulse responses to shocks in the euro area. The response of
ination to a monetary shock is now slightly hump shaped, but it peaks just two quarters
after the shock. Moreover, the response of all variables to a monetary shock is more delayed
than in the United States.
As was the case for the United States, a positive productivity shocks raises total output
but lowers hours worked and the output gap on impact, consistent with the evidence in Galí
(2004). Because many rms initially do not know about the shock, they do not raise their
output as much as they would with full information. Likewise, an increase in the elasticities
of substitution (that is, a positive markup shock) raises hours worked and output, but leads
to a negative output gap, because the expansion is smaller than would be the case with full
information. Aggregate demand shocks boost ination and the output gap and thus raise
nominal interest rates, via the Taylor rule.
Table 5 has the variance decompositions for the euro area. Monetary policy shocks play
a signicantly larger role in explaining the variability of output growth and hours worked
than they did in the United States, while productivity shocks are also more important
drivers of output and ination. Aggregate demand shocks are still important in explaining
output and hours worked, as are markup shocks for ination.
6 Robustness ofthe esti mates
This section summarizes the impact of several changes to the specication choices on the
posterior estimates. Starting with the priors, I attempted a few variations from the baseline
in table 1. Because fully characterizing the posterior distributions is computationally time
consuming, I focused only on their modes. The three experiments were as follows: raising
the prior mean for the elasticity of labor supply from 2 to 4; lowering the prior mean
correlation of the shocks from 0.9 to 0.5; and setting the prior standard deviation of the
shocks equal to a in each region, rather than to the 0.5 in-between value. Each of these
changes had a negligible di¤erence in the mode of the posterior distribution.
23With regards to the policy rule, an alternative to the Taylor rule in equation (23) with
serially correlated shocks is an inertial rule:
it = ppt + y(yt   yc
t) + iit 1   "t; (43)
where the "t are serially uncorrelated. I estimated this alternative model and obtained a
mean posterior estimate for i of 0:25 for the United States and 0:16for the euro area. In
terms of overall t to the data, the results are mixed. For the United States, the marginal
density for the inertial rule is higher, whereas for the Euro-area, the Taylor rule with
correlated shocks dominates.
In terms of the data, the main issue to address is a clear upward trend in hours worked
in the euro area, associated with the slow decline in European unemployment. In the main
results, I dealt with it by removing a linear trend from the data. Using a Hodrick-Prescott
(HP) lter led to the same results. There is no trend in the U.S. data, so detrending it with
the HP lter or even not detrending it at all led to almost indistinguishable data series.
Finally, looking at the sample periods, Mankiw and Reis (2007) estimated a subset of
the parameters using postwar U. S. data. Relative to the results in table 2, they nd that
workers and consumers update their information every ve to six quarters, on average, which
is close to the euro area estimates in this paper. They also nd much more persistent and
volatile monetary policy shocks, such that monetary shocks account for a large share of the
volatility of the macroeconomic series. One conjecture for what is behind this discrepancy
is that including the high ination of the 1970s in the sample requires large monetary policy
shocks that play a large role in the business cycle.
7 Poli c y questi ons
To begin applying the two estimated models to policy analysis, I explore some questions
about monetary policy.
7.1 W hat rule has best desc ri bed poli c y?
An extensive literature, starting with Taylor (1993), documents that the policy rule in
equation (23) provides a good description of policy in the United States and a reasonable
description of policy in the euro area. Within this common rule, there is room for di¤erences
24between the two regions in the parameters of the rule.
According to the estimates in tables 2 and 4, monetary policy has been quite similar
in the United States post-1986 and in the euro area post-1993, especially in only modestly
responding to real activity. The estimates of p and y are somewhat lower than the typical
result in the literature, but the more surprising posterior mean is the is the low persistence
of monetary policy shocks, especially in the United States.
As noted in section 5, the estimated quick response of most macroeconomic variables
to monetary policy shocks is linked to these low estimates of persistence. Figure 3 backs
this claim by comparing the impulse responses in the status quo with the response after
raising the persistence of monetary shocks from the posterior means to the prior mean of
0:9. This change reestablishes the conventional delayed hump-shaped responses found in
the literature on the post-war United States (Christiano et al, 1999).14
7.2 W hat i s the role ofpoli c y announc ements?
The past decade has seen an increasing emphasis on transparency in central banking. Part
of the argument for transparency is that if the central bank acts predictably, it will reduce
confusion and mistakes on the part of private decisionmakers. According to this point of
view, if policy shocks must take place, then they should be announced in advance and
clearly communicated to the general public. In the context of the SIGE model, this calls
for announcing monetary policy shocks a few quarters in advance, so that a large fraction
of agents have time to learn of the event in the interim between announcement and action.
Figure 4 shows the results from announcing a monetary policy shock one or two years
ahead in the United States and the euro area. The exercise here consists of learning at date
t = 0 the value of the monetary shock to occur at dates t = 4 or t = 8 . The announcement
is therefore still a shock in the sense of a deviation from the policy rule. The gure reveals
that ination and nominal interest rates move even before the shock materializes because
forward-looking agents react instantly to the news of a future shock. The agents that
update their information learn about the shocks before it happens and adjust their actions
in response. In both regions, announcements lower the initial impact of monetary policy
shocks on hours worked and the output gap, while signicantly increasing the overall impact
14Coibion (2006) rst pointed out the role of the persistence of interest-rate shocks at delivering hump-
shapes.
25on ination.
7.3 W hat i s the result ofhavi ng i nterest rates move gradually?
As described by Bernanke (2004), the FOMC tends to change interest rates gradually.
Academic arguments in favor of such actions typically involve nancial stability, the gradual
revelation of news, or the desire to move long-term interest rates. Woodford (2003c) notes
that in forward-looking models like SIGE, gradualism involves combining policy responses
with announcements of future policy changes.
Figure 5 compares three di¤erent patterns of shocks for the two regions. In the rst
case, there is a one-standard-deviation shock to interest rates at date 0. In the second case,
there are four consecutive shocks, each of size "=4 and each coming as a surprise to the
agents. In the third scenario, the sequence of four shocks is announced at date 0. The results
indicate that an anticipated gradual cut in interest rates has a much stronger impact than
an expected cut of the same size. If the gradual cut is unexpected, however, the impact is
actually smaller. Therefore, gradual policy changes can be quite e¤ective according to the
SIGE model, but only if they are announced and credible.
7.4 How would Taylor s proposal c ompare?
Taylor (1993) originally suggested that the interest rate responses to ination and output
should be 1.5 and 0.5, respectively. Figure 6 compares this rule with the one estimated
here for the impulse responses of ination and hours worked to productivity and aggregate
demand shocks. For both shocks and both regions, Taylors more aggressive policy rule
leads to a smaller response in the output gap to the shock. The unconditional variance of
hours worked would fall by 1.3 percent (2.7 percent) if the United States (euro area) moved
to this rule, and welfare would be 4 (6) basis points of steady-state consumption higher.
7.5 How does a pri c e- level target c ompare?
Ball, Mankiw, and Reis (2005) show that in an economy with inattentive rms, the optimal
policy is an elastic price standard that keeps the price level close to a deterministic target
Kt, allowing for deviations of the price level from the tar get in response to deviations of
26output from the Pareto-optimal level:
pt = Kt   (yt   yo
t) (44)
Under this rule, positive deviations of ination from the target are not bygones, but must be
accompanied by future negative deviations in order to revert the price level back to target.
Figure 7 shows the impulse responses to productivity and aggregate demand shocks of
having a strict rule with  = 0. In the United States, fully stabilizing ination has little
impact on the response of hours worked. The response of hours worked to the markup
shocks (not reported) becomes signicantly more pronounced, though, so the rule has a
negative e¤ect on welfare of 4 basis points on impact. For the euro area, the welfare loss
from this rule would be a substantial 17 basis points.
Figure 8 graphs the responses to an elastic rule, where  is set following the guidelines
of Ball, Mankiw, and Reis (2005).15 The  for the United States is 0.12, while that for the
euro area is 3.08. Both lead to a slight loss in welfare relative to the Taylor rule with the
estimated coe¢cients.
8 Conc lusi on
The aim of this paper was to build one particular model of the macroeconomy that can be
used to give systematic policy advice. The two guiding principles behind the construction
of the model were, rst, that inattentiveness is a feature of behavior that a¤ects all markets
and decisions and, second, that it is the only feature that leads to a deviation from an
otherwise classical equilibrium. In reality, many frictions are probably at play, but insisting
on a single friction allows one to explore how far inattentiveness alone a¤ects macroeconomic
dynamics and policy, while staying within a coherent theoretical framework where in which
all details are explicitly stated.
Many of the details of the model, as well as the way in which the parameters were picked,
may be open to debate, and there is room for disagreement on how well the model ts the
15More concretely, Ball et al (2005) show that the optimal  is the inverse of the product of ( 1+ )=( 1+ )
and the relative weight of relative-price distortions and output-gap uctuations in the policymakers objective
function. I approximate this relative weight by the ratio of the change in the volatility of the output gap
and the change in the volatillity of ination, both in response to a 1 basis point increase in the standard
deviation of all shocks.
27data. I have tried throughout the paper to highlight the theoretical gaps in the model, the
di¤erent views on how to set its parameters, and the ways in which it succeeded and failed
at explaining the data. In the models defense, it did not seem to perform noticeably worse
than some popular alternatives, like the models in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(2005), Levin, Onatski, Williams and Williams (2006), or Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007).
While the models performance is probably still far from the level of success one should
demand to condently give precise policy recommendations, the exercise did provide some
policy lessons. First, the persistence of monetary policy shocks has been low, and this is a
crucial determinant of the speed at which ination and output respond to these shocks. Sec-
ond, announcements and gradualism, through their e¤ects on the expectations of forward-
looking agents, can have a large impact on the e¤ects of monetary policy. Third, Taylors
suggested policy rule parameters would lead to lower employment volatility and higher social
welfare than the status quo, while an elastic price standard has a disappointing performance
when inattentiveness is pervasive.
28Appendi x
A.1. Inattenti ve ac ti ons. Planner-savers, who every period face a probability  of
revising their plans, have a value function V (Mt) conditional on date t being a planning
date. They chooses a plan for current and future consumption all the way into innity
fCt+l;lg1
l=0 since with a vanishingly small probability she may never update again:



















subject to the sequence of budget constraints in equation (9) and a no-Ponzi condition.
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where  t+l;t+1+k =
t+k Q
z=t+l
z+1 is the the compound return between t + l and t + 1 + k for
k > l. Now, for l = 0, the right-hand side of equation (46) is the same as the right-hand
side of equation (47). Therefore, C
 1=
t;0 = V 0 (Mt), or the marginal utility of an extra unit
of consumption equals the marginal value of an extra unit of wealth. Using this result to
replace the V 0 (Mt+1+l) terms in equation (47) and writing the equation recursively gives
the Euler equation in (10). The second Euler equation in equation (11) then follows.
The worker faces a similar problem:




























subject to the sequence of budget constraints in equation (9), a no-Ponzi condition, and the
demand for the variety of labor j in equation (14), which each worker supplies monopolis-
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Now, as in the consumer problem, combining equation (49) for l = 0 with equation (50)
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w)~ 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t;0
~ t   1
: (51)
This expression shows that   is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply for attentive agents and
that the marginal disutility of working is equated to the real wage rate times the marginal
value of wealth times a markup taking into account the elasticity of demand for the good.
Using it in the optimality condition leads to the two Euler equations in equations (16) and
(17).
A.2. The log- li near equi li bri um f or the f ull model. At the non-stochastic steady
state, the ve exogenous processes are constant. Using the conditions dening the optimum,
it follows that output is Y = AL, consumption is C = Y=G, and labor is
{L1+1=  =
G(   1)(   1)
(1   w)(1   p)
: (52)
I log-linearize the equilibrium conditions around this point. Small caps denote the log-
deviations of the respective large-cap variable from the steady state, with the exceptions
of: t and t; which are the log-deviations of ~ t and ~ t; rt; which is the log-deviation of the
short rate Et[t+1]; and Rt; which is the log-deviation of the long rate l i mk! 1 Et[ t;t+1+k ].
Starting with the goods market, log-linearizing the demand for good j by combining
equations (3) and (6) gives:
yt;i = yt   (pt;i   pt): (53)
The production function in equation (5) and the rms optimality condition in equation (7)
30become:




(wt   pt) + (1   )yt   at   t=(   1)
 + (1   )

: (55)
Turning to the bond market, the consumers Euler equations in equations (10) and (11)
become:
ct;0 = Et (ct+1;0   rt); (56)
ct;j = Et j (ct;0): (57)
Next, in the labor market, the demand for a labor variety in equation (14), together
with the market-clearing condition in this market, leads to:
lt;k = lt   (wt;k   wt): (58)
and the optimality conditions in the workers problem become:
















wt;k = Et k (wt;0): (60)








(1   !)kwt;k; (62)
yt = gt + 
1 X
j=0
(1   )jct;j; (63)
These eleven equations over time characterize the equilibrium solution for the set of twelve
variables (yt;i; yt; ct;0; ct;j; lt;0; lt;k; lt; wt;k; wt; pt; pt;i; rt) as a function of the 5 exogenous
processes (at; gt; t, t, "t). There is one equation missing, the policy rule in equation
(23).
31A.3. The reduc ed- f orm aggregate relati ons. Integrating equation (54) over i gives
the aggregate production function in equation (19).
For the Phillips curve, starting with equation using (61), replace yt;j using equation (53)
and pt;i using equation (55). Rearrange to obtain equation (20).
Moving to the IS curve, iterate equation (56) forward and take the limit as time goes
to innity. Then, the facts that there is complete insurance and that eventually all agents
become aware of the shocks imply that l i m! 1 Et (ct+;0) = l i m! 1 Et [yt+]  y1
t . Using
the denition of the long rate Rt and replacing for ct;0 in equations (57) and (63) gives
an expression for output. Using the fact that l i m! 1 Et [gt+] = 0 gives the IS curve in
equation (21).
Finally, for the wage curve, take very similar steps as in the IS curve: iterate equation
(59) forward and use the solution to replace wt;0 in equation (60). Combining the wt;j in
the aggregator for wt in equation (62) and replacing out lt;j using equation (58) gives the
wage curve in equation (22).
A.4. ProofofProposi ti on 1 and 2. Take the case of s = a. By a method of
undetermined coe¢cients, equations (19) through (22) imply (omitting the (s) arguments
to save space):
^ yn = ^ an + ^ ln (64)
^ pn = n

^ pn +
 ^ wn + (1   )^ yn   ^ an   ^ n=(   1)
 + (1   )

(65)
^ rn = ^ yn+1=n+1   ^ yn=n (66)
( +  ) ^ wn = 
n [(  + )^ pn + ( ^ wn   ^ pn) + ln +  ^ yn=n] (67)
Rearranging the rst three equations immediately proves proposition 2. Using the rst two
expressions to replace ^ ln and ^ wn in the fourth expression proves proposition 1. The case of
the other four shocks follows along the same lines.
A.5. ProofofProposi ti on 3. Taking again the case s = a, combining the Taylor rule
with the Fisher equation, and again omitting the s arguments, the undetermined coe¢cients
are
^ rn + ^ pn+1   ^ pn = p(^ pn   ^ pn 1) + y(^ yn   n^ sn):
Using the results in propositions 1 and 2 to replace for ^ rn and ^ yn and rearranging delivers
32the proposition. The other cases are similar.
A.6. ProofofProposi ti on 4. Since the Kt is known to all agents, real variables are
neutral with respect to it, and it only induces a deterministic component in prices. Focusing
on the stochastic component, in terms of moving-average coe¢cients, the policy rule implies
that
^ pn = (^ yn   ~ n^ sn):
Using the expression in Proposition 1 to replace ^ yn delivers the result.
A.7. Soluti ons f or other i nterest- rate rules. The proofs for the case of these rules
follow along the same lines as propositions 3 and 4 so they are omitted. First, consider
alternative interest-rate rules:
Proposi ti on 7. I fp o licyf o llo ws th e interest- rate rules belo w, th e und eterminedco e¢cients
f o r th e p rice level satisf yth e seco nd - o rd er d i¤erence equatio n:
An+1^ pn+1(s)   Bn^ pn(s) + Cn 1^ pn 1(s) = Dn(s) f o r n = 0;1;2;::: (68)
with An = 1 + 	n=n and Dn(") =  1 f o r all cases.Th e remainingco e¢cients are as
f o llo ws:
 Fo r th e emp lo y ment rule,it = ppt + ylt:
Bn = An + p + y	n=; Cn = p; and: (69)
Dn(s) =
8
> > > <




n+1^ sn + y [n(s)   1]= for s = a
(n(s) 1)
n  
[ n+1(s) 1] ^ sn+1




n+1^ sn + yn(s)= for s = ;
(70)
 Fo r th e sp eed - limit rule,it = ppt + y(yt   yc
t):








n+1^ sn + y
n
n(s)   (s)  
[ n 1(s) (s)] ^ sn 1
^ sn
o
for s = a;;
[ n(s) 1]
n  
[ n+1(s) 1] ^ sn+1
n+1^ sn + y
n
n(s)   (s)  
[ n 1(s) (s)] ^ sn 1
^ sn
o
for s = g
(72)
33 Fo r th e inertial rule,it = (1   i)





B0 = A0 + (1   i)p + (1   i)y0(s); (73)
Bn = An(1 + i) + (1   i)p + (1   i)y0(s); n  1; (74)
Cn = (1   i)p + iAn; and : (75)
Dn(s) =
8
> > > > > > <







+y (1   i)(n(s)   (s))
for s = a;;
[ n(s) 1] (1 i)
n  
[ n+1(s) 1] ^ sn+1
n+1^ sn  
i[ n 1(s) 1] ^ sn 1
n 1^ sn
+y (1   i)[n(s)   (s)]
for s = g
(76)
 Fo r th e wag e- inatio n rule it = pwt + y(yt   yc
t),th e co e¢cients are:
Bn = An + p f[1 + (1=   1)](1=n   1) + (1   1=)	ng + y	n; (77)
Cn = p f[1 + (1=   1)](1=n   1) + (1   1=)	ng;
Dn(s) =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <










i for s = a
[ n(s) 1]
n  
[ n+1(s) 1] ^ sn+1


































 for s = 
(78)
Finally, consider alternative price-targeting rules:
Proposi ti on 8. I fp o licyrule f o llo ws o th er p rice- level stand ard s,th e und eterminedco e¢-
cients f o r th e p rice level are as f o llo ws:





[1   n(s)] ^ sn=( + 	n) for s = a
 n(s)^ sn=( + 	n) for s = g;;
(79)
34f o r n = 0;1;2;:::
 witha sp eed - limit rule pt = Kt   (yt   yo
t):
(1 + 	n)^ pn(s)   	n 1^ pn 1(s) = f[(s)   n(s)] ^ sn   [(s)   n 1(s)] ^ sn 1g;
(80)
f o r n = 0;1;2;::: with ^ p 1(s) = 0.
 withan inertial rule pt = Kt   (yt   yo
t) + ppt 1:
(1 + 	n)^ pn(s)   p^ pn 1(s) = [(s)   n(s)] ^ sn (81)
f o r n = 0;1;2;::: with ^ p 1(s) = 0.






~ (s)   n(s)
i




> > > <
> > > :
^ sn= for s = a
^ sn=(   1) for s = 
0 for s = g;;
1 + [1 + (1=   1)](1=n   1) + (1   1=)	n + 	n
(82)
f o r n = 0;1;2;:::
A.8. ProofofProposi ti on5. Since Xt is a sum of multivariate normal distributions it




0. Using the formula for the density of a multivariate normal, the result
in the proposition follows immediately.
A.9. ProofofProposi ti on 6. Taking the unconditional expectation through the


















Recalling the denition of the log-linearized values, ct;j = l n(Ct;j) l n(C) and lt;j = l n(Lt;j) 









1 + 1= 
#
d j: (84)
Recall that I assumed that the tax on prices exactly o¤sets the monopoly distortion
in the goods market: 1   p = =(   1); the tax on wages exactly o¤sets the monopoly
distortion in the goods market: 1   w = =(   1); and the distortion from government
spending is, on average, zero: G = 1. In this case, the non-stochastic steady state is an
e¢cient equilibrium without uncertainty. These assumptions lead to focusing monetary
policy on the task of stabilizing economic activity (Woodford, 2003a). From equation (52),
they imply that {L1+1=  = .
In the log-linear solution of the model, both ct;j and lt;j are normal variables with a zero
mean. Therefore, social welfare is:
l n(C)  






0:5(1 + 1= )2V ar(lt;j)

d j: (85)
Because lt;j is a normal variable, V ar(lt;j) is a linear function of the variance of the exogenous
shocks. These are small in the data, so approximating e xp[V ar(lt;j)] by 1+V ar(lt;j) involves
very little numerical error. Social welfare then becomes:
l n(C) + (1 + 1= )   0:5(1 + 1= )
Z 1
0
V ar(lt;j)d j (86)
Using the distribution of workers according to when they last updated, this becomes:
l n(C) + (1 + 1= )   0:5(1 + 1= )!
1 X
j=0
(1   !)jV ar(lt;j) (87)
Next, combining equation (58) with equations (59) and (60) to replace wt;0 gives the
following expressions:






























































i=0(1   !)i. Ignoring the terms that are invariant to policy changes, the
social welfare function then becomes the expression in (40). To evaluate the welfare benet
in percentage units of steady-state consumption of a policy that implies (1) starting from
another that implies (0), use (87) to obtain (39).
A.10. M CM C algori thm. I used a Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to draw from the
posterior. In the rst step, I looked for the mode of the posterior distribution by using line-
search and Newton-Raphson algorithms starting from 20 di¤erent points on the parameter
space (chosen from previous estimates of similar models, and from drawing randomly from
either the prior or a uniform on the parameter space). In the second step, I used a mixture of
normal approximations around the highest local maxima found, to obtain an approximation
of the posterior. This is then used as the proposal function for the Metropolis-Hastings
algorithm. In the third step, I took a few sequences of 2,000 draws, scaling the variance-
covariance matrix of the proposal function by di¤erent values, until the acceptance rates of
the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm are 10-20%.
In the fourth step, I took 5 independent sequences of 200,000 draws, discarding the rst
100,000. Inspecting the 500,000 mixed draws made clear that the algorithm was far from
converging, and that the normal approximation of the posterior was poor. I therefore revised
the proposal function to a normal distribution with a variance-covariance matrix equal to
the scaled estimated of the variance-covariance matrix of the existing 500,000 draws.
In the fth step, I took 5 independent sequences of 1,000,000 draws, discarding the
rst 100,000 draws and keeping only every 10th draw to save on memory space. The
Brooks-Gellman scale reduction factors and the plots of the between-chain and within-chain
variances indicated the results were satisfactory in terms of convergence, so I proceeded to
37mix them to have the nal 450,000 draws of the posterior, which are used in all the tables.
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Table 1. Prior distribution 
 
Parameters  Density  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Percentiles 
(2.5; 50; 97.5) 
Pref erences         
!  1+ G  11  3 .16   5.8 0 ; 10.6 7 ; 18 .08  
"  1+ G  11  3 .16   5.8 0 ; 10.6 7 ; 18 .08  
#  G  2  2.00  0.05 ; 1.3 9 ; 7.3 8  
Non- policy sh ock s         
$g  B  0.90  0.20  0.23  ; 0.99 ; 1.00 
%g  G
- 1/ 2  0.50  0.24  0.21 ; 0.3 9 ; 1.02 
$!  B  0.90  0.20  0.23  ; 0.99 ; 1.00 
%!  G
- 1/ 2  0.50  0.24  0.21 ; 0.3 9 ; 1.02 
$"  B  0.90  0.20  0.23  ; 0.99 ; 1.00 
%"  G
- 1/ 2  0.50  0.24  0.21 ; 0.3 9 ; 1.02 
Monetary policy         
&p  1+ G  1.24  0.25  1.00 ;  1.16  ; 1.92 
&y  G  0.3 3   0.25  0.03  ; 0.27 ; 0.97 
$'  B  0.90  0.22  0.23  ; 0.99 ; 1.00 
%'  G
- 1/ 2  0.50  0.11  0.21 ; 0.3 9 ; 1.02 
I nattentiveness         
(  U  0.50  0.29  0.03  ; 0.50 ; 0.98  
)  U  0.50  0.29  0.03  ; 0.50 ; 0.98  
*  U  0.50  0.29  0.03  ; 0.50 ; 0.98  
 
Notes:  Th e densities are th e gamma (G),  beta (B) and unif orm (U).   45
Table 2. Posterior distribution f or th e United States 
 
Parameters  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Percentiles 
(2.5; 50; 97.5) 
Pref erences       
!  10.09  2.6 7  5.8 3  ; 9.75 ; 15.93  
"  9.09  2.6 4  4.74 ; 8 .8 3  ; 14.6 3  
#  5.15  2.52  1.18  ; 4.94 ; 10.95 
Non- policy sh ock s       
$g  0.99  0.01  0.98  ; 1.00 ; 1.00 
%g  0.8 3   0.16   0.59 ; 0.8 1 ; 1.23  
$!  0.28   0.10  0.08  ; 0.28  ; 0.48  
%!  0.11  0.06   0.03  ; 0.09 ; 0.26  
$"  0.8 6   0.08   0.71 ; 0.8 5 ; 1.00 
%"  0.12  0.06   0.05 ; 0.11 ; 0.27 
Monetary policy       
&p  1.17  0.16   1.01 ;  1.12 ; 1.6 0 
&y  0.06   0.03   0.01 ; 0.06  ; 0.14 
$'  0.29  0.12  0.07 ; 0.3 0 ; 0.52 
%'  0.44  0.09  0.3 0 ; 0.43  ; 0.6 5 
I nattentiveness       
(  0.08   0.03   0.03  ; 0.08  ; 0.16  
)  0.74  0.17  0.3 4 ; 0.78  ; 0.98  
*  0.52  0.17  0.28  ; 0.48  ; 0.94 
 
Notes:  All numbers f rom using 450, 000 draws f rom th e posterior. 
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Table 3 . Variance decompositions f or th e United States 
 
Panel A. Contributions to unconditional variance. 
      Sh ock      









   I nf lation  1 
[  0 ,  3 5 ]  
7 
[  1 ,  3 5 ]  
3  
[  0 ,  58  ]  
11 
[  1 ,  58  ]  
6 8  
[  7 ,  92 ]  
   I nterest rate  24 
[  1 ,  6 9 ]  
6  
[  1 ,  3 0 ]  
3  
[  0 ,  44 ]  
8  
[  2 ,  28  ]  
49 
[  8  ,  8 4 ]  
   Output growth   0 
[  0 ,  3  ]  
4 
[  1 ,  11 ]  
94 
[  8 3  ,  98  ]  
0 
[  0 ,  1 ]  
1 
[  0 ,  5 ]  
   Hours  0 
[  0 ,  0 ]  
4 
[  1 ,  21 ]  
94 
[  26  ,  98  ]  
0 
[  0 ,  0 ]  
1 
[  0 ,  70]  
   Wage growth   12 
[  1 ,  3 0 ]  
45 
[  20 ,  77 ]  
6  
[  1 ,  18  ]  
8  
[  3  ,  22 ]  
24 
[  0 ,  59 ]  
 
Panel B. Contribution to 1- q uarter ah ead,  1- year ah ead,  and 4- year ah ead variance 
      Sh ock      









   I nf lation  7 ,  3  ,  1  12 ,  7 ,  7   3  ,  2 ,  2  6 4 ,  24 ,  12  8  ,  57 ,  71 
   I nterest rate  6 3  ,  40 ,  26   6  ,  6  ,  6   1 ,  2 ,  2  21 ,  12 ,  9  5 ,  3 1 ,  49 
   Output growth   0 ,  0 ,  0  1 ,  3  ,  4  98  ,  95 ,  94  0 ,  0 ,  0  0 ,  1 ,  1 
   Hours  0 ,  0 ,  0  3 5 ,  3 2 ,  21  6 4 ,  6 7 ,  75  0 ,  0 ,  0  0 ,  1 ,  3  
   Wage growth   11 ,  12 ,  12  47 ,  46  ,  45  6  ,  6  ,  6   6  ,  9 ,  8   26  ,  23  ,  24 
 
Notes:  All numbers are in percentage units. I n panel A,  th e median and,  in parenth esis,  th e 2.5 
and 97.5 percentiles come f rom 10, 000 parameter draws f rom th e posterior distribution. I n panel 
B are reported medians f rom th e same number of  draws. Rows will not add up to 100,  since th e 
medians are cell- by- cell. 
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Table 4. Posterior distributions f or th e Euro- area 
 
Parameters  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Percentiles 
(2.5; 50; 97.5) 
Pref erences       
!  8 .16   1.3 1  5.94 ; 7.98  ; 10.8 0 
"  7.11  0.75  5.49 ; 7.26  ; 8 .3 4 
#  2.70  0.43   1.92 ; 2.74 ; 3 .46  
Non- policy sh ock s       
$g  0.99  0.01  0.95 ; 0.99 ; 1.00 
%g  0.3 7  0.10  0.22 ; 0.3 5 ; 0.6 2 
$!  0.70  0.21  0.3 1 ; 0.6 7 ; 0.98  
%!  0.08   0.05  0.03  ; 0.07 ; 0.20 
$"  0.3 7  0.15  0.09 ; 0.3 9 ; 0.6 2 
%"  0.19  0.09  0.08  ; 0.17 ; 0.41 
Monetary policy       
&p  1.06   0.10  1.00 ; 1.01 ; 1.3 5 
&y  0.07  0.02  0.01 ; 0.05 ; 0.24 
$'  0.51  0.11  0.27 ; 0.54 ; 0.6 6  
%'  0.46   0.12  0.3 0 ; 0.44 ; 0.75 
I nattentiveness       
(  0.21  0.11  0.10 ; 0.17 ; 0.52 
)  0.3 1  0.18   0.15 ; 0.26  ; 0.93  
*  0.58   0.15  0.26  ; 0.6 2 ; 0.79 
 
Notes:  Same as table 2. 
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Table 5. Variance decompositions f or th e Euro- area 
 
Panel A. Contributions to unconditional variance. 
      Sh ock      









   I nf lation  2 
[  0 ,  18  ]  
15 
[  1 ,  52 ]  
12 
[  0 ,  8 5 ]  
40 
[  5 ,  91 ]  
2 
[  0 ,  46  ]  
   I nterest rate  3 0 
[  8  ,  78  ]  
10 
[  1 ,  26  ]  
7 
[  0 ,  71 ]  
22 
[  4 ,  78  ]  
4 
[  0 ,  3 7 ]  
   Output growth   16  
[  4 ,  42 ]  
25 
[  11 ,  42 ]  
50 
[  20 ,  79 ]  
3  
[  1 ,  16  ]  
1 
[  0 ,  12 ]  
   Hours  2 
[  0 ,  17 ]  
5 
[  0 ,  27 ]  
8 4 
[  28  ,  99 ]  
1 
[  0 ,  6 4 ]  
0 
[  0 ,  2 ]  
   Wage growth   2 
[  0 ,  22 ]  
3 1 
[  10 ,  53  ]  
1 
[  0 ,  5 ]  
3 6  
[  4 ,  71 ]  
20 
[  3  ,  8 0 ]  
 
Panel B. Contribution to 1- q uarter ah ead,  1- year ah ead,  and 4- year ah ead variance 
      Sh ock      









   I nf lation  3  ,  4 ,  3   8  ,  3 1 ,  26   2 ,  3  ,  4  78  ,  53  ,  48   5 ,  4 ,  3  
   I nterest rate  6 0 ,  46  ,  40  3  ,  15 ,  14  1 ,  1 ,  2  25 ,  25 ,  25  7 ,  6  ,  5 
   Output growth   18  ,  16  ,  16   12 ,  24 ,  26   6 3  ,  51 ,  49  3  ,  3  ,  3   1 ,  1 ,  1 
   Hours  17 ,  13  ,  6   14 ,  18  ,  13   6 0 ,  59 ,  6 9  3  ,  2 ,  1  1 ,  0 ,  0 
   Wage growth   2 ,  2 ,  2  13  ,  3 1 ,  3 1  1 ,  1 ,  1  47 ,  3 4 ,  3 6   3 2 ,  21 ,  20 
 
Notes:  Same as table 3 .   49
 
F igure 1. I mpulse response f unctions in th e United States to th e f ive sh ock s 
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F igure 2. I mpulse response f unctions in th e Euro- area to th e f ive sh ock s 
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F igure 3 . I mpulse response f unctions to a more persistent monetary sh ock  
 
Panel A. United States 
 







I n f l a t i o n






No mi n a l   i n t e r e s t   r a t e






Ho u r s








Ou t p u t   g a p
Es t i ma t e s
Wi t h   mo r e   p e r s i s t e n t   s h o c k s
 
 
Panel B. Euro- area 
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F igure 4. I mpulse response f unctions to policy announcements 
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Panel B. Euro- area 
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F igure 5. I mpulse response f unctions to gradual movements in policy 
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F igure 6 . I mpulse response f unctions with  Taylor rule 
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Panel B. Euro- area 
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F igure 7. I mpulse response f unctions with  strict price- level target 
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Panel B. Euro- area 
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F igure 8 . I mpulse response f unctions with  elastic price- level target 
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